|
Review by Stephen Zarlenga
A Deeper Look Into "Tragedy and Hope"
Prof. Carroll Quigley's Tragedy and Hope: A History
of the World in Our Time was one of the most important
historical and predictive works to appear in the 20th century.
The book was also among the century's most misunderstood
and under-appreciated works of historiography.
First published in 1964, the scope of Tragedy is
enormous, with 1,348 pages providing important insights
into the forces that have shaped Western civilization. Quigley
divided these forces into six aspects: military, political,
economic, social, religious and intellectual. These six
aspects then "fall into the three major areas of: the
patterns of power, rewards and outlooks."
Note that Prof Quigley placed military force at the head
of the list. He was a hard-nosed realist when it came to
the role of power in society; to the ultimate basis of power
upon armed force; and of the dependence, reach and effectiveness
of armed force upon weaponry. Thus he stated:
". . . [T]he nature, organization and control of weapons
is the most significant of the numerous factors that determines
what happens in political life." [p. 1,200]
Quigley was a highly creative mind in understanding how
these forces influenced the evolution of civilizations.
He taught what he had learned to his students at Georgetown
University, at Harvard and at Princeton; and wrote a textbook
for college students throughout the United States.
Tragedy is also presented from the vantage point
of one who was close to the official halls of American power,
as a lecturer on diverse subjects at the U.S. Naval Weapons
Laboratory, the State Department's Foreign Service Institute,
the Naval College and the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces. He was a consultant to the Congressional Select
Committee, which created NASA, and to the Navy's Project
Seabed whose task in 1964 was to project what U.S. Naval
weapons systems would be like 12 years out. In addition
are his memberships in scholarly bodies such as the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, the American
Anthropological Association and the American Economic Association,
to name just a few. Any one of these accomplishments could
be considered as a milestone lifetime achievement.
But what really intrigued many of Quigley's readers (or
more accurately his reviewers) was his awareness, proximity
and understanding of the workings of the unofficial levers
of western power; and more specifically a group which evolved
from what he referred to as the Anglo American Establishment
in an earlier manuscript, and which he calls the "British-American
Atlantic Establishment" in this book. Quigley clearly
knew more about these matters than anyone else who has been
cling to discuss them publicly.
Most past reviews of this book have suffered from overly
focusing on their own area of interest-namely conspiracy--Quigley's
fascinating references to the behind the scenes forces conspiring
to affect the course of history. In large part, these reviews
have really been the same review in different formats, and
I don't believe they effectively encouraged people to actually
read Quigley. Many reviewers also jumped to the conclusion
that Quigley himself was one of the conspirators.
But those who convinced themselves that Quigley was a promoter
of this conspiracy have been unable to give coherent explanations
of why he wrote the book. The contradiction or paradox arises
from the book's most quoted paragraph by these reviewers:
"I know of the operations of this network because
I have studied it for twenty years and was permitted for
two years, in the early 1960% to examine its papers and
secret records. I have no aversion to it or most of its
aims and have, for much of my life, been close to it and
to many of its instruments. I have objected, both in the
past and recently, to a few of its policies (notably to
its belief that England was an Atlantic rather than a European
power and must be allied, or even federated, with the United
States and must remain isolated from Europe), but in general
my chief difference of opinion is that it wishes to remain
unknown, and I believe its role in history is significant
enough to be known." [p. 950, emphasis added]
Obviously, acknowledging and publicizing the existence
of this secret group operating in a conspiratorial manner
is the single most effective way to thwart them. So how
can that be reconciled with Quigley's professed support
of "most" of their goals? Perhaps the minority
of their goals which he didn't support, were the ones regarding
their own positions of supreme imperial power in the unfolding
development of mankind. Indeed, if we merely take Quigley
at his word in the above quotation, aligning England firmly
into the European Community and reducing its influence in
the United States would in fact quickly reduce if not obliterate
the power and influence of the "network."
Significantly, in these conservative reviews, when that
paragraph is quoted, the key parenthetical is usually not
included. It is left out, and an ellipsis is inserted instead.
It is also very noteworthy that powerful elements of the
English establishment continue to act today in that behavior
mode criticized by Quigley: refusing to join fully in the
European Union and exerting far too much influence on the
United States, for example through NATO, as is apparent
from the Yugoslav war reporting.
For a dramatic example of this book's relevance to understanding
current events, let's briefly examine the Yugoslav war,
which analysts from across the political spectrum were unable
to explain satisfactorily. Try as they might, none could
make much sense of NATO's very disproportionate bombing
campaign against that small country--a merciless campaign
even waged against civilian infrastructure. But, what if
we add one of Quigley's concepts to the mix?
In the ongoing civil war, there had been reports of many
atrocities being committed by Serb and Kosovar alike. But
the NATO bombing appeared to do more harm to those Kosovars
it was supposed to be helping, than the offending Serbs
had been doing.
Why was the campaign carried on with such a vengeance that
it appeared the very survival of a great power was at stake?
Perhaps it was/is.
Certainly not any of America's vital interests, or the
English people's vital interests are at stake. But perhaps
the vital interests--even survival--of the secret power
network exposed by Quigley are at stake. Consider the dynamic
consolidation of the European Union, with a greater population
and greater economic production than the U.S., and now with
the introduction of the new Euro currency the entire area
will be able to get out from under Alan Greenspan's dollar
"hammer."
True to Quigley's main criticism England has remained aloof
from the European Community, though arguably it would be
advantageous to the English people for her to join. But
England's power structure would then just be one among 11
other states, and their system of balancing one European
power against another would be relegated to history's dustbin
of dirty tricks. Since they are not really at home in America
either, if the European Community and its currency succeed
as they in all likelihood will, then the so called Anglo
American Establishment which Quigley exposed, would be largely
isolated there in the Atlantic between two great powers.
One "solution"? Stop the European community.
How? It may be impossible. But perhaps with enough destabilization
on the Balkan underbelly, Europe can be put off balance
for a time, giving the opportunity for more such actions
to arise. Also, if the responsibility for rebuilding Yugoslavia
can be dumped onto the Europeans, it would be hard to think
of a worse way to lead off the new Euro currency's career.
This is not to say that additional interests and factors
are not also in play; they always are.
The section of Tragedy entitled 'European ambiguities"
[p. 1279] presents invaluable perspectives for understanding
the current disposition of the European Community, along
with its potential strengths and historic weaknesses, and
the role which must be played by England, for an optimal
resolution of "the problem of Germany"--the fact
that a united Germany eventually becomes such a powerhouse,
that other states fear and act against her.
We return to Quigley's reasons for directing conciliatory
remarks toward the goals of the group. Blatantly exposing
the existence of this unseen power network could have jeopardized
the publication of the book. By directing a few "friendly"
phrases toward it (which when properly analyzed are not
be so friendly after all), no red flags were raised--at
Macmillan and Company Publishers. That this was a real problem
was demonstrated later by Macmillan's refusal to print a
second edition after wide attention was focused on the exposure
of the secret network, even though there was a good demand
for the book.
Moreover, Quigley's earlier manuscript, called "The
Anglo American Establishment," which describes the
group at the end of World War II in some precise detail
with names and dates, and, in a more critical manner, had
proved unpublishable and was gathering dust at Georgetown
since 1949. I learned of its existence in 1980 through a
strange and unique set of accidental occurrences beginning
14 years earlier on the Greek island of Rhodes. With the
help of one of Quigley's confidants, I found it in the archives
and published it in 1981.
While those secret power network discussions coming from
a scholar of Quigley's stature are very significant and
would be more than enough reason to read Tragedy and
Hope concentrating only on them doesn't do justice to
the totality of the book. For example by page 21, using
his demographic concepts of how civilizations evolve, Quigley
has predicted that the west should expect to be feeling
"Asiatic pressure" about the year 2,000 A.D.
Further, he explains why a different sequence of developments
in factors such as ideology, weapons and agriculture has
produced very different results in the east as compared
to western civilization. For example in the west the agricultural
and industrial revolutions and raising of living standards
occurred before the weapons developments of the early- to
mid-1900s. This made it possible for individual citizens
to have access to the same weapons at the disposal of the
state.
But "In Asia these better weapon arrived before Living
standards could be raised by the agricultural revolution.
. . As a result governments in Europe in 1930 hardly dared
to oppress the people and democracy was growing; but in
to non-European world by 1930 (and even more by 1950) governments
did dare to, and could, oppress their peoples, who could
do little to prevent it" [pp. 22-23].
One of the most significant sections of the book is on
"Financial Capitalism" starting on page 50:
"This third stage of capitalism is of such overwhelming
significance in the history of the 20th century; and its
ramifications and influences have been so subterranean,
and even occult, that we may be excused if we devote considerate
attention to its organization and methods."
This section contains one of the book's most intriguing
paragraphs:
"The influence of financial capitalism and of the
international bankers who created it was exercised both
on business and on governments, but could have done neither
if it had not been able to persuade both these to accept
two "axioms" of its own ideology. Both of these
were based on the assumption that politicians were too weak
and too subject to temporary popular pressures to be trusted
with control of the money system; accordingly, the sanctity
of all values and the soundness of money must be protected
in two ways: by basing the value of money on gold and by
allowing bankers to control the supply of money. To do this
it was necessary to conceal, or even to mislead, both governments
and people about the nature of money and its methods of
operation." [p. 53, emphasis added]
Throughout the monetary research I've done over the last
10 years, that statement is accurate, very important and
generally unrecognized. Quigley gives one example of the
deception:
". . . [B]ankers, as creditors in money terms, have
been obsessed with maintaining the value of money, although
the reason they have traditionally given for this obsession--that
sound money' maintains business confidence'--has been propagandist
rather than accurate."
He goes on:
"Inflation, especially a slow steady rise in prices,
encourages producers, because it means they can commit themselves
to costs of production on one price level and then later
offer the finished product for sale at a somewhat higher
price level." [pp. 46-47]
Such a situation is usually best for working people, while
"price stability," the Federal Reserve's 1990s
mantra, has been really good for paper manipulations, but
bad for the average working man.
Whether Quigley is discussing central banking and the onset
of the Great Depression; or developments in inter-war Germany;
or conditions in Japan just before President Harry Truman
decided to use nuclear weapons; the reader feels a confidence
in Quigley's knowledge of behind-the-scenes facts and analysis
which probably never made it into the newspapers of the
day.
Reading from page 1,200 on, one is struck by the accuracy
of Quigley's projections on present-day events and problems.
The effects of a fully professional army for example, in
changing wars from the bloody all-out citizen soldier efforts
of the Civil War, World War I and World War II, to wars
where casualties are avoided at almost any cost. Quigley
tells us in 1964, to expect warfare where leaders like Sadam
Hussein are left in control, to avoid inconvenient power
vacuums.
Indeed for those who are not history buffs, who may have
difficulty getting through the early chapters in a timely
way, simply shift your approach and read from page 1200
first. Quigley's relevance to the present day will become
immediately obvious, in these fascinating pages. One section
discusses why the middle class hasn't been successful in
passing their values on to their children; a factor which
Ouigley considered of great importance. No punches are pulled,
no psycho babble used; and some readers will squirm as they
recognize Quigley is zeroing in on a few of their own foibles.
Quigley analyzes the unfortunate move toward sensationalism
in culture and concludes that "the most therapeutic
action in which any society can engage" is to rely
on experience in the historical sense and to link up with
the society's traditions. And he concisely presents the
"Western Tradition" [pp. 1,226-91]. Here one learns
what the misused terms "liberal" and "conservative"
really mean, in a way that not even one in a hundred among
politically astute observers understand.
He calmly demonstrates why Puritanism is essentially opposed
to the Western Tradition. For example the Puritan view is
that truth is found by rational deduction from revelation;
whereas the orthodox western view is that truth is found
from experience and revelation, interpreted by tradition.
"The Puritan point of view tended to support political
despotism and to seek a one-class uniform society, while
the older view (still represented in the Anglican and Roman
Churches) put much greater emphasis on traditional pluralism
and saw society as a unity of diversities" [p. 1226-9].
Quigley worried greatly about the ready availability of
chemical and nuclear weapons, for it is these sorts of weapons
that will dominate warfare for the duration of the West
[Photo]
Above, an old man plods through the wasteland of Nagasaki
This powerful section, I suspect, is one of the reasons
the Quigley reviews were so narrow and one sided.
The final chapter presents elements of what Quigley views
as tragic, and/or hopeful in the evolving future. To understand
these, one must keep in mind the overriding importance Quigley
placed on weapons systems.
The main tragedy which Quigley has accurately foreseen
is the growing centralization of power and consequent pressure
placed on democratic institutions. To him, this was a matter
of weaponry:
"There seems little reason to doubt that the specialist
weapons of today will continue to dominate the military
picture into the foreseeable future. If so, there is little
reason to doubt that authoritarian rather than democratic
political regimes will dominate the world into the foreseeable
future." [p. 1,201]
He presents the "hope" that in this negative
scenario it may still be possible to live a "full social
or intellectual life whose value may be even more significant
than a democratic political or military structure."
This was written before the imposition of the intellectually
stifling regime of "political correctness" was
even considered a possibility. In this area Quigley underestimated
the intellectual viciousness which would accompany the process
of "obtaining obedience."
Another related hope: ". . . [A]ny increase in defensive
weapon power would stop the growth in size of power areas
and would in time reverse this tendency."
Quigley presents the tragedy of how easily and cheaply
biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction could
be manufactured in a kitchen laboratory. However, Quigley's
weapons orientation could even see a hopeful possibility
in the spread of such weapons:
" . . . This might well contribute toward the decentralization
of power already discussed" [p. 1,210].
He analyzes the tragedy of the U.S.A. and Russia in a nuclear
face-off; and the hope that because there could be no winner,
it would not happen. (Note: The "hope" in this
area fades if the Russians have nothing to lose.)
Quigley also discusses the importance and possibility of
developing independent energy and materials sources, as
a precondition of political and economic decentralization.
I believe he would have seen great "hope" in the
development of the Internet, a potentially major decentralizing
force in communications, which he did not foresee.
I'll close with Quigley's observation on the need for a
democratic educational process to teach the whole man, rather
than just specializations:
"We need a culture that will produce people eager
to do things, but we need even more a culture that will
make it possible to decide what to do . . . Decisions about
goals requires values, meaning, context, perspective. They
can be set . . . only by people who have some inkling of
the whole picture" [p. 1,274].
Author
Stephen Zarlenga, who worked more than 30 years in the
world of investment, speculation and publishing on political
economy subjects, has for several years concentrated on
research in monetary history and theory. He is the director
of the American
Monetary Institute and recently published
The Lost Science of Money: The
Mythology of Money — The Story of Power.
Source
The review was originally published in The Barnes Review
VI/1 (Jan-Feb, 2000): 39-46
|
